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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Corporations—Derivative Action—Demand on Shareholders—Excuse.-
Levitt v. Johnson.'—Fidelity Capital Fund, Inc., a Massachusetts corpora-
tion, entered into management contracts with several investment advisory
corporations, whereby it paid them fees according to a fixed percentage of
Fidelity's capital assets. Levitt, a minority stockholder of Fidelity brought
this derivative action alleging (I) that several of Fidelity's directors were affi-
liated with the advisory corporations, (2) that the fees voted by Fidelity's di-
rectors were excessive, and (3) that the directors had thereby breached
'their fiduciary duty to Fidelity in violation of the Investment Company
Act. 2 Because the corporation had 48,000 shareholders, plaintiff felt that to
poll them as a condition precedent to his bringing a derivative action would
be futile. Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
the absence of a demand on stockholders must be explained in the pleadings.
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the action and
found that, although an excuse appeared in plaintiff's pleadings, it was not
sufficient under controlling Massachusetts law which, the court felt, required
making a demand on shareholders, no matter how numerous. 3 On appeal, the
First Circuit vacated the judgment below and HELD: if Massachusetts law
on excusing the demand on shareholders were as strict as the lower court be-
lieved, it would not control because it would conflict with the purpose of the
Investment Company Act.
The democratic structure of a corporation ordinarily requires that no
action be taken allegedly on behalf of the corporation by a single stockholder
without the approval of a majority of the stockholders. 4 If a minority share-
holder believes that the corporation needs protection, he must first seek ac-
tion from the directors' unless they themselves are the wrongdoers and a
demand on them would be futile.° If they refuse, the minority shareholder
generally must then petition his fellow shareholders to take appropriate ac-
tion unless the alleged wrong cannot be ratified by a majority of them.' Al-
1 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S. Ct. 649 (1965).
2 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1958).
Section 37 of the act declares in part:
Whoever steals, unlawfully abstracts, unlawfully and wilfully converts to his
own use or to the use of another, or embezzles any of the moneys, funds,
securities, credits, property, or assets of any registered investment company shall
be deemed guilty of a crime. . . .
A definition of an affiliated person is found in § 2(a)(3):
Affiliated person of another person means .. (C) any person directly or in-
directly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other
person . . . (E) if such other person is . . . any investment adviser . . . or any
member of an advisory board [of an investment company]... .
3 Levitt v. Johnson, 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass. 1963).
4 See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. 1951).
5 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460, 461 (1882); Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d
138, 140 (1st Cir. 1962); Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 534,
109 N.E. 452, 454 {1915).
Carroll v. New York, N.H. & 	 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956); Pomer-
antz v. Clark, supra note 4; Citin v. Greater N.Y. Indus., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
7 Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529 (6th Cir. 1915); Continental
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though generally obligatory, courts vary in permitting non-performance of
this requirement. For example, one court required demand on 8 million share-
holders!' Some jurisdictions leave the determination of an excuse to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.9 And at least one state by statute has abolished
the requirement of making demand upon shareholders.'°
Since the purpose of making this demand is to obtain balanced con-
sideration of the issues, the larger the number of shareholders, the less likely
is the possibility of getting such full consideration. 11 Thus, since the pur-
pose of the demand cannot be reasonably fulfilled where the number of stock-
holders is large, some courts have excused the requirement of demand upon
them as a condition precedent to a derivative action. 12
Since the instant case involved a Massachusetts corporation, the dis-
trict court felt compelled to consult Massachusetts law relative to the de-
mand requirement and its excuses.' 3 Massachusetts, like the majority of
states, requires a demand upon shareholders, as a condition precedent to a
derivative action, when directors have refused to act." Thus in Dunphy v.
Traveller Newspaper Ass'n, 15 the Massachusetts court, restating the general
rule enunciated in Hawes v. Oakland, 16 stated:
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); but see S. Solomont & Sons Trust,
Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
8 Pomerantz v. Clark, supra note 4.
9
 Berg v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky. 1944); Escoett v.
Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A.2d 277 (1954).
19 Ohio Rev, Code Ann. § 2307.311 (1964):
In any action or proceeding brought or maintained by an owner „ . of shares
in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation, the plaintiff ... must ..
allege with particularity his efforts to secure from the directors such action as
he desires and the reasons for failure to obtain such action, or the reasons for
not making such effort.
The Comment to this section states:
Minder the laws of some states, a shareholder, in order to qualify, must aver
and prove with particularity the efforts he made to secure corporate action from
the directors and from the shareholders. In the above section there is no require-
ment that the shareholder make any effort to obtain action by the other share-
holders. It is sufficient that he aver and prove that he endeavored to obtain
action by the directors, because the matter of determining whether or not to
bring suit . . . is normally a question for the directors to decide.
11 Levitt v. Johnson, supra note 1, at 818.
12
 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (excused
demand on 667,000 shareholders) ; Citrin v. Greater N.Y. Indus., Inc., supra nate 6, and
Berg v. Cincinnati N. & C. Ry., supra note 9 (both cases excused demand on numerous
shareholders); Slutzker v. Rieber, 132 N.J. Eq. 406, 28 A.2d 525 (1942) (excused
demand, assuming stockholders numerous). But see Bruce & Co. v. Bothwell, S F.R.D.
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (required demand on 20,000 shareholders holding 9,000,000 shares);
but where just the number of shares and not the number of shareholders is pleaded as
an excuse, some courts have required demand. See Haffer v. Voit, 219 F.2d 704 (6th
Cir. 19.55); Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 2951); Varanelli v. Wood, 9
F.R.D. 61 (S.D.NX. 1949).
13
 Levitt v. Johnson, supra note 3, at 808, 809.
14
 S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., supra
note 7; Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra note 5; Dunphy v. Traveller News-
paper Ass'n, 146 Mass. 495, 16 N.E. 426 (1888).
13 Supra note 14.
19
 Supra note 5; the Hawes decision is the basis of Rule 23(b) of the F.R.C.P.;
see 50 Va. L. Rev. 365 (1964).
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Courts of equity are swift to protect helpless minorities of
stockholders of corporations from the oppression and fraud of ma-
jorities. But the legal relations into which the members of a cor-
poration enter require them to seek redress for supposed wrongs done
them as stockholders from its officers, and from the corporation it-
self, before applying elsewhere."
The court then dismissed the action partly for failure to make a demand
upon the directors, and ruled that where the alleged wrongdoers are them-
selves the controlling majority of shareholders, the minority shareholder need
not make a demand on them. Again in Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.
R.R.' 8 the court simply reiterated Dunphy, and dismissed the derivative ac-
tion for failure to make a sufficient demand on the directors. The court rested
on this failure and did not reach the question of demand on large numbers
of shareholders.
Not until S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres
Operating Corp. 119 did the excuse from the requirement of demand upon
shareholders vary from the majority states. In Solomont, which involved a
corporation composed of a small number of shareholders, the court held that
a majority of shareholders, uninvolved in the alleged wrong, after due
consideration of the issues, can bar a derivative action if they believe it
would be in the best interest of the corporation. Thus, even when the share-
holders could not ratify the wrong, a demand upon them is still required. 2°
Such a requirement when the corporation consists of a small number of
shareholders is reasonable. 21 One effect of this decision was to remove from
possible available excuses in Massachusetts for not making demand upon
shareholders that of the non-ratifiability of the act by thern. 22
Recently, the Massachusetts court in Datz v. Keller, 23 dismissed plain-
tiff's derivative action for failure to plead any demand or excuse therefrom
upon shareholders. Thus, like Rule 2 3 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Massachusetts requires this demand or the pleading of an "adequate
excuse" for not making it. The Datz court restated that where an impartial
corporate forum is unavailable because it is controlled by the wrongdoers, a
minority stockholder is excused from the demand on shareholders. This
control of the forum by the wrongdoers or the need for immediate action,
are the only declared excuses, in Massachusetts, from the demand. 24 Spe-
cifically, the Massachusetts courts are silent on whether a large number of
shareholders, if pleaded as an excuse, would excuse demand.
17 Supra note 14, at 496-97, 16 N.E. at 430.
18 Supra note 5.
19 Supra note 7.
10 Id. at 113, 93 N.E.2d at 248.
21
 See Halprin v. Babbitt, supra note 5.
22
 But see Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, supra note 7.
23
 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 491, 196 N.E.2d 922 (1964).
24
 Datz v. Keller, supra note 23; S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., supra note 7; Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra
note 5; Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905);
Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870).
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Although the state court is silent on the issue of numbers as an excuse,
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, applying
its understanding of Massachusetts Iaw, has adopted a stern approach to
allowing excuses for making demand based on numbers. In Pomerantz v.
Clark,23
 a diversity action, plaintiff pleaded the futility of making demand
on several million policyholders. The district court held that, since the share-
holders might vote to bar the suit, a large number of shareholders is no ex-
cuse, in Massachusetts, for not making the demand.26 Without balancing
the burden upon a minority shareholder of requiring a demand on large
numbers of shareholders against the futility of reasonably expecting the
shareholders in a large corporation to respond as the shareholders in the
small Solomont corporation did, the district court required a demand upon
eight million policyholders of the John Hancock Life Insurance Co. Admit-
ting that a large number of shareholders lessens the likelihood of their in-
formed participation in corporate affairs, the district court, citing the dic-
tum in Bartlett as authority for requiring demand on a large number of
shareholders, concluded that where the shareholders are not controlled by
the wrongdoers, a demand is always required, regardless of their number,
because they might reasonably decide to bar the suit.
In Carroll v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 27 another diversity action in-
volving a large number of shareholders, the district court, citing Pomerantz
and Solomont, again held that merely because the number of shareholders
was large, this would not excuse demand. But, the court continued, even
when a majority of the shareholders participating in a shareholders' meet-
ing might be corruptly allied with the wrongdoers, this would still not ex-
cuse demand upon a majority of all the shareholders. 28 In the instant case,
the district court followed its same strict construction of the Massachusetts
requirement by holding that a demand on 48,000 shareholders was necessary
for standing to sue, even though the action rested on the Investment Company
Act rather than diversity of citizenship which was the basis of jurisdiction
in Pomerantz and CarroIl.29
These prior decisions by the district court raise the question of the
validity of the court's interpretation of Massachusetts law as holding a large
number of shareholders immaterial in determining an excuse from a demand
upon them. This view has been criticized as being both unrealistic" and prob-
ably contrary to Massachusetts law. S 1 As pointed out in Halprin v. Bab-
bitt,32 the purpose of a demand upon shareholders is to evoke full and fair
consideration of the issues. In Halpin, the First Circuit required a demand
by a minority shareholder upon the controlling shareholder although the
board of directors elected by this majority shareholder had refused to act. In
the instant case, the court said:
25 Supra note 4.
29 Id. at 343.
27 Supra note 6.
28 Id. at 458.
20 Infra note 37 and accompanying text.
80 See Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 746 (1960).
31 See Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1952).
32
 Supra note 5.
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If their number is small, as in Halprin, and the minority could
reasonably be expected to put its case before them, it should be ob-
liged to do so.33
Thus, the plaintiff should be required to make the demand only when it
would be reasonable to expect his fellow shareholders to give the required
full consideration of the issues; otherwise it would be futile to require it.
Where large numbers of shareholders are involved, as in the instant case,
a demand should be excused, for "not only would such a burden be enor-
mous, but no disclosure that plaintiff could be expected to make would
be likely to persuade a majority to take over the action, or, conversely,
permit an informed decision by the majority that the action be not in-
stituted."'"
In the instant case, the circuit court, in vacating and remanding for re-
consideration of the need for demand upon shareholders under the circum-
stances, suggested that the requirement under Massachusetts Iaw was not as
strict as the district court understood it to be. Alternatively, the court found
that if Massachusetts law were that stern, it would not apply in the instant
case because it would defeat the purposes of the Investment Company Act.
One purpose is "to mitigate and . . . eliminate" inter-locking directorates of
investment funds controlled by their investment advisors which result in
payments of excessive fees by the funds to the advisors 85 Thus, to burden
a minority shareholder with the requirement that he make a demand upon
the numerous shareholders of investment companies conflicts with this pur-
pose of the act for, in some cases, it could bar the action 3a
Although the circuit court was aware of the need for an applicable law,
if Massachusetts law ,
 did not apply, it did not expressly find that some form
of "federal common law" should be applied." But, in a similar action based
on the act, the Second Circuit, citing Textile Workers Union of America
v. Lincoln Mills," said:
Indication of Congressional intent to create a body of federal law
giving rise to a distinctive federal claim has been found from evi-
dence less compelling than lin the Investment Company Act.jue
03 Supra note 1, at 818.
34 Ibid.
35 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1958). See Eisenberg & Phillips,
Mutual .Fund Litigation—New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 Colum.
L. Rev. 73 (1962).
30
 As the court in Pomerantz v. Clark, supra note 4, at 346, stated:
To prevent these minority members from suing until they have acquired the
support of a majority . .. is in most cases to throttle them. They must move
against inevitable inertia which always favors the status quo, the respectable
and the powerful, particularly if, regardless of wrongdoing, a particular com-
pany has prospered. They rarely have large funds at their command to circularize
and arouse their fellows.
37
 For increasing application of and problems concerning "federal common law"
see Notes, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 331 (1965); 74 Yale L.J. 325 (1964); 50 Va. L.
Rev. 365 (1964); 69 Yale L.J. 1428 (1960).
33
 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
30
 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961).
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In Lincoln Mills,40 which involved labor legislation, 41 the Supreme Court
said:
[the lack of express statutory sanction . . . will be solved by look-
ing at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem. . • [For] it is not uncom-
mon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are
concerned. 42
Futhermore, in actions based on other federal statutes, federal courts, inter-
preting congressional intent, have created federal rules in furtherance of the
intendment of the particular act."
Further support for the creation of a "federal common law," if Massa-
chusetts law is inapplicable, is found analogously in I. I. Case Co. v. Barak."
There, the state law was silent on any available relief to the plaintiff, a
shareholder suing to void a merger obtained by misrepresentation in proxies
in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 45 Similarly, in the in-
stant case, Massachusetts courts are silent on whether a large number of
shareholders is an excuse. In Borak, the Supreme Court said:
[I] t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. .
[W] e believe that the overriding federal law applicable here would,
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress de-
spite the provisions of state corporation law.	 . . Moreover, if
federal jurisdiction were limited . . . the hurdles that the victim
might face . . . might well prove insuperable to effective relief."
Thus, if the Massachusetts law were as stringent as the district court thought,
its application in the instant case would inhibit the purposes of the act. In
that event, the First Circuit intimates, the scope of federal common law
should include federally created rules of decision governing legitimate ex-
cuses from making demand upon shareholders as a condition precedent to
bringing a derivative action under the Investment Company Act.
JOHN M. MORAN
Estate Taxation—Nature of Insurance Proceeds Includible in Decedent's
Gross Estate.—In re Noel.'—This action was brought to review a finding
made by the Commissioner that proceeds paid under a flight insurance policy
40 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 38.
41 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
42 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 38, at 457.
43 Rogers v. American Can Co., supra note 22; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961). See Notes, cited supra note 37.
44 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
45 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1958).
46 Supra note 44, at 433-35.
1 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
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